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Abstract
We study the impact of interactions between the bank lending channel and the traditional
interest rate channel on the efﬁciency of the monetary policy transmission in Poland since
1994. First, we develop a small open-economy credit-augmented model with an interest rate
control, ﬂexible prices, imperfect capital mobility and nominal wage indexation. Under two
different exchange rate arrangements, namely aﬁxedrateregimewithsterilizedintervention
and a pure ﬂoating rate regime, we establish that the bank lending channel may amplify but
also attenuate the impact of monetary policy shocks on output, prices and the real exchange
rate as compared to the standard interest rate channel. The variations in the interest rate
spread between the loan rate and the central bank’s intervention rate are found to be a good
indicator when distinguishing between ampliﬁcation and attenuation effects of monetary
policy shocks, provided that there is a positive relationship between both rates. Second,
using the interest rate spread indicator, we ﬁnd attenuation effects of monetary policy
impulses from the beginning of 1996 to mid-1998, and on average a neutral effect of the
bank lending channel from mid-1998 to June 2001.
JEL Classiﬁcation: P20, F41, E51, E52
Keywords: Monetary policy, Bank lending channel, Economic transition
1 This is a revised version of a paper presented at the CEPR Transition Economics Workshop for Young Academics,
Portorož, Slovenia, 26th June-5th July 2001. I am grateful to László Halpern, Hartmut Lehmann, Janez Prasnikar,
Gérard Roland, Mark Schaffer, Àdàm Szeidl, Grzegorz Trojanowski, and many other participants at the Workshop
for helpful comments. I would like also to thank Anton Brender for guidance and Jérôme de Boyer des Roches,
Balázs Ègert, Olivier Grosse, Hélène Lenoble-Liaud, Joël Métais, Jean-Marie Renaud and Jérôme Sgard for useful
suggestions. Finally, many thanks go to people from the National Bank of Poland who helped me in obtaining the
time series used in this paper: Jakub Borowski, Michał Brzoza-Brzezina, Norbert Cie´ sla, Marta Gołajewska, Paulina
Krzysztoﬁk, Małgorzata Pawłowska, Zbigniew Pola´ nski and Paweł Wycza´ nski. The standard disclaimer applies.
Comments are welcome.
∗ Place du Marchal De Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris. E-mail: Rafal.Kierzenkowski@dauphine.frIntroduction
It is widely accepted that monetary policy actions conveyed through various interrelated
transmission channels have a signiﬁcant impact on real economic activity (at least in the short run) and
inﬂation. There is also a broad consensus that more than a decade after the beginning of transition, the
Polish capital markets are still fairly shallow as compared to international standards and the ﬁnancial
system is principally a bank-oriented one. These stylized facts motivate our study since we seek to
explain the role played by the banking sector in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in
Poland from 1994 to mid-2001. More speciﬁcally, we investigate the impact of interactions between
the bank lending channel and the traditional interest rate (or money) channel within an open economy
framework. The difﬁculties of the authorities’ control over credit activity prove that the Polish banking
sector is a key element in the understanding of the efﬁciency of monetary policy actions during the
1990s (Pola´ nski, 1998; Brzoza-Brzezina, 2000).
B a s e do nt h eB e r n a n k ea n dB l i n d e r ’ s( 1 9 8 8 a , b )s e m inal model of the transmission mechanism, the
main result presented in the literature states that the bank lending channel generates an ampliﬁcation
of monetary policy actions when compared to the traditional interest rate channel. The existence of
an imperfect substitutability between bonds and loans on the asset side of the banking sector and on
the liability side of ﬁrms makes monetary policy more restrictive (expansionary) due to a reduction
(increase) in the loan supply by the banking sector to “bank-dependent” borrowers
2. The variations in
both the spread between loan and bond interest rates and the credit supply summarize the amplifying
nature of the bank lending channel: the interest rate spread increases (decreases) and the supply of
credit decreases (increases) in the event of a restrictive (expansionary) monetary policy (Bernanke,
1993).
Following Dale and Haldane (1993,1998) and using the Bernanke and Blinder’s (1988a,b) model,
Kierzenkowski (2001) demonstrates that the bank lending channel can either amplify or attenuate
the effects of the traditional interest rate channel, since the systematic ampliﬁcation result is in fact
conditioned by several special assumptions (see Bernanke and Blinder (1988a) for their detailed
exposition). The attenuation corresponds to a situation where the impact of monetary shocks on
output is smaller than in the standard IS/LM model. This work also establishes that, as a general
rule, after a monetary policy shock the direction of change in the spread between loan and bond
interest rates is a good indicator of the asymmetric feature of the bank lending channel. Following a
monetary tightening (expansion) there is an increase (decrease) in the interest rate spread in the event
of ampliﬁcation effects and a decrease (increase) when monetary policy shocks are attenuated.
2 See, for instance, Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993).
2However, these testable implications cannot be used for empirical investigations in Poland since
Polish monetary authorities use an interest rate target monetary policy and not, as assumed in the
model, a base money one. More generally, we study the impact of an interest rate control within a
Bernanke and Blinder’s (1988a,b) framework that we extend in several ways. We consider a small
open-economy credit-augmented model with ﬂexible prices, an imperfect nominal wage indexation
and capital mobilityunder two different exchange rate regimes: aﬁxed rate with sterilized intervention
and a ﬂoating rate. Within this framework, we derive the theoretical assumption that must be met in
order to use the variations in the interest rate spread between the loan rate and the central bank’s
intervention rate as a valuable indicator of the bank lending channel asymmetry.
The paper is organized as follows. The ﬁrst section provides a bird’s eye view on Polish monetary
policy during the 1990s. In the second section, we develop the theoretical credit-augmented model.
Finally, in the third section, we use the testable implications of the model to investigate the efﬁciency
of the transmission mechanism from February 1994 to June 2001.
1 An Overview of the Polish Monetary Policy in the 1990s
1.1 The Main Goals of Monetary Authorities
The monetary policy during the 1990s aimed to achieve several goals, but this task proved to be
difﬁcult because of constant changes in the national and international environments.
The primary goal was to carry out a lasting disinﬂation process in order to converge to an inﬂation
level comparable to those prevailing in the European Union countries. This objective was fulﬁlled
even though the disinﬂation path was rather slow. The main instrument of monetary policy used for
this purpose was the interest rate policy.
The weakness of Polish exporters’ competitiveness was the second authorities’ concern. Thus, they
acted in order to control the volatility of the nominal exchange rate and to curb the appreciation of
the real exchange rate. Different types of ﬁxed exchange rate policies implemented since 1990 played
a major role in this respect. However, the growing commercial and ﬁnancial integration of Poland
considerably increased the cost of these policies, implying huge and costly sterilization operations,
particularly since 1995.
Finally, in order to stimulate national currency savings, special attention was given to guarantee
positive real interest rates in zlotys’ denominated deposits.
31.2 The Monetary Policy Trade-offs
Until 1994, the disinﬂationandpro-exporters’ policies didnot encounter major external constraints.
Yet, the problem of their consistency emerged. A ﬁxed exchange rate system against the US dollar
was in force between January 1990 and May 1991. It acted as a nominal anchor for inﬂation while
producing a strong real appreciation, which turned the trade surplus in 1990 into a deﬁcit in 1991.
After a 14.4percentdevaluationof thezlotyagainst the USdollar, anda briefperiodofﬁxed exchange
rate against a currency basket, Poland adopted a pre-announced crawling-peg regime in October
1991. This mechanism was designed to offset the inﬂation differential between Poland and its main
commercial partners. The zloty was devaluated on a daily basis against a basket of currencies with a
publicly known monthly rate. The devaluation rate was reduced each time the registered inﬂation was
lower. However, in order to limit the pro-inﬂationary characteristics of this mechanism, the initially
ﬁxed devaluation rate was lower than the inﬂation rate (Pola´ nski, 1999). This led to an appreciation
of the real exchange rate, and consequently to a fall in exports, pushing the authorities to conduct two
separate devaluations against the basket: 8 per cent in February 1992 and 12 per cent in July 1993.
Figure 1. Basket Exchange Rates, V/95 - VIII/00
Composition of the basket prior to 1999: 45 per cent USD, 35 per cent DEM, 10 per cent GBP, 5 per cent FRF and 5 per cent CHF.
Since 1.01.1999: 55 per cent EUR , 45 per cent USD.
Source: National Bank of Poland.
1994 was a transitory year, characterized both by capital inﬂows and a rise in the central bank’s
gross ofﬁcial reserves. There were several factors that announced their escalations (Pola´ nski, 1998).
First, between 1991 and 1993, most long-term and partial short-term (e.g. resulting from T-bill
transactions) capital ﬂows were liberalized. Second, privatization of ﬁrms occurred with an increased
involvement of foreign investors. Third, the agreemen t ss i g n e df o rf o r e i g nd e b tr e s c h e d u l i n gw i t hb o t h
the Paris and London Club creditors (respectively in 1991 and 1994) and positive growth prospects led
4several rating agencies to give positive marks to Poland, enabling the country’s return to international
capital markets. More importantly, the co-existence of a pre-announced crawling-peg exchange rate
regime, and apolicy ofhighinterest rates(seeFigure4), bothacted asmagnetsforshortcapitalinﬂows
in search of high return with relatively low risk, especially after the December 1994 Mexican ﬁnancial
crisis.














Source: National Bank of Poland.
In 1995, the stock of gross ofﬁcial reserves increased from 6 to 15 USD billion (see Figure 3). Two
factors were behind this huge foreign assets growth. First, although the ofﬁcial trade balance was in
deﬁcit, the existing price differential between Poland and its neighbours produced a strong increase of
unregistered foreign trade which, included in the current account statistics, yielded a 5.5 USD billion
surplus. Second, for the aforementioned reasons, there were long-term and short-term capital inﬂows.
Throughout 1995, in order to counter appreciating pressures and defend the crawling-peg mechanism,
the National Bank of Poland (hereafter NBP) carried out interventions on the foreign exchange
market that it subsequently sterilized. In the perspective of future debt repayment, the increase of
gross ofﬁcial reserves was initially welcomed by monetary authorities (Durjasz and Kokoszczy´ nski,
1999). Nevertheless, in mid-May 1995 the central bank introduced a pre-announced crawling-band
mechanism with a +/−7 per cent exchange rate band around the central parity rate. The essence of
the crawling-peg mechanism was preserved but the introduction of the band aimed to increase the
risk of foreign portfolio investments. Moreover, in order to break the appreciation anticipations, the
authorities made a 6 per cent appreciation of the exchange rate (in December 1995) and reduced the
rate of crawl to 1 per cent on a monthly basis (in January 1996).
In the 1996-1998 period, the gross ofﬁcial reserves accumulation and the appreciation pressures
on the exchange rate continued as capital inﬂows overﬁnanced the increasing deﬁcit of the current
5account. Short-term capital inﬂows were particularly huge in 1997 amounting to 2.1 USD billion.
This resulted from the interest rate differential between Polish and foreign int e r e s tr a t e s( s e eF i g u r e
4), but also from an almost absent exchange risk that lasted until the end of 1997. As shown in
Figure 1, the central bank continued its interventions on the foreign exchange market by closely
controlling the nominal exchange rate in a much narrower corridor than the ofﬁcial band. By this
method, it was slowing down the appreciation of the real exchange rate (see Figure 2). However, the
monetary authorities had to sterilize the impact of their interventions afterwards by using open-market
operations. Were the opposite to occur, there was the potential risk that the increase in the base money
w o u l ds u b s e q u e n t l yl e a dt oad e c r e a s ei nm a r k e ti n t e r e s tr a t e s . T h i sw o u l dh a v ei n c l u d e dT - b i l l s ,
lending and deposit rates and would have undermined the disinﬂation interest rate policy. Therefore,
e v e r yr i s ei ng r o s so f ﬁcial reserves was followed by an increased scale of open-market operations for
a given interest rate. The withdrawals of liquidity were conducted primarily with 1 to 14-days reverse
repo operations, with the central bank’s securities issued for different maturities in the 1994-1997
period, and with the 28-days NBP’s securities since then. They created a situation of net indebtedness
of the central bank towards commercial banks.
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Gross Official R eserves End- of- Year Profit
Source: National Bank of Poland.
In December 1998, the scale of overliquidity of commercial banks absorbed in open-market
operations and in mandatory reserves amounted to 13.6 USD billion, approximately 14.2 per cent of
the total assets of the commercial ba n ks e c t o r( N B P ,1 9 9 8 ) .T h ec o s to fs terilization operations ranged
b e t w e e n1 - 1 . 5p e rc e n to fG D Pi n1 9 95-1997 according to Nuti (2000) and were of the order of 0.7-0.8
per cent of GDP between 1997 and 1998 according to Rosati (1999). This led toa ne x h a u s t i o no ft h e
NBP’s proﬁt (see Figure 3) and required a gradual evolution towards a ﬂexible exchange rate system.
Exchange rate bands were progressively widened to 10, 12.5, and ﬁnally 15 per cent. Above all, the
6NBP ceased its direct interventions on the foreign exchange market since the end of July 1998, and
its indirect interventions by abolishing ﬁxing transactions starting in June 1999 (Pola´ nski, 2000). This
move eliminated the main source of overliquidity in the banking system. Finally, a ﬂoating exchange
rate system was adopted in April 2000.
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3-Month Rate Differential 12-Month Rate Differential
Per cent
3 (12)-Month Rate Differential = 3 (12)-Month Polish Treasury bill rate− 3 (12)-weighted average foreign rate− crawling peg devaluation,
weighted average foreign rate = weighted average of interbank interest rates of zloty basket currencies.
Source: National Bank of Poland, Datastream and own calculations.
2 A Simple Small Open-Economy Model of the Bank Lending Channel
2.1 General Assumptions
In the closed-economy model developed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988a,b) monetary policy is
characterized in terms of the authorities’ control over banking reserves, assuming ﬁxed prices. We
extend this framework in several ways.
First, in a perfectly deterministic environment without any stochastic disturbances, we invert the
p o l i c yr u l e ,m o d e l l i n gt h ec e n t r a lb a n ka so p e r a t i n go n interest rates rather than controlling the base
money. The interest rate control assumption reﬂects the actual conduct of monetary policy in Poland
since 1994. According to Osi´ nski (1995, 1999) and Sławi´ nski and Osi´ nski (1997,1998), the NBP was
setting a 1-day reverse repo interest rate (and more generally was controlling the short-term WIBOR
T/N interest rate
3) in the 1994-1995 period, while during the 1996-1997 period the main interest rate
instrument was a 14-days reverse repo rate. Since February 1998, the Monetary Policy Council sets
the minimum yield on 28-days NBP’s securities. For the period under study (February 1994 - June
3 Tomorrow Next Warsaw Interbank Offer Rate
72001), these interest rates were used in open-market operations in order to mop up the excess liquidity
of the banking system created by a combination of strong capital inﬂows and ﬁxed exchange rate
policies followed near the end of the 1990s. We calcu l a t e das i n g l ei n t e r v e n t i o nr a t eo ft h eN B Pa sa
weighted average of 1 to 14-days reverse repo operation rates and that of the central bank securities
issued for different maturities between February1 9 9 4a n dJ a n u a r y1 9 9 8a n d ,s i n c et h e ne q u a lt ot h e
actual rate on 28-days NBP bills
4. As it appears in Figure 5, our indicator of monetary policy stance
is almost equal to WIBOR T/N and, since at least August 1994, is very close to the yield of 3-month
and 1-year Treasury bills on the primary market.
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Source: National Bank of Poland and own calculations.
An indicator of monetary policy stance comparable to ours is used by Kokoszczy´ nski (1999).
Moreover, similarlytoKokoszczy´ nski(1999), we ﬁnda signiﬁcant impactofourindicatoron Treasury
bill interest rates. More precisely, as shown in Table 1, the intervention rate (IC)G r a n g e rc a u s e d
the 3-month Treasury bill interest rate (IB3M) for the entire period under consideration, the 6-month
interest rate (IB6M) in the February 1994 - August 1998 period
5 b u tf a i l e dt oa f f e c tt h e1 2 - m o n t hr a t e
(IB12M). However, in the latter case, the expected relationship still occurred for a shorter period of
time. On the whole, by controlling its intervention rate, the central bank exerts an important inﬂuence
on the market interest rates. Given these different observations, we assume, for the sake of simplicity,
that the bond interest rate of the model
6 and the yield of NBP’s securities, i.e. the intervention rate, are
perfect substitutes (hence both are equal). Presenting the model, we use both terms interchangeably.
Second, we model two exchange rate regimes in order to take into account the heterogeneity of the
4 The indicator also includes the average rate of outright operations, which were systematically used
since September 2000 and seldom before that date.
5 Due to breaks in data since August 1998, the test could not be made for the entire period.
6 Empirically, Bernanke and Blinder (1988a,b) use the 3-month Treasury bill interest rate as a proxy
for the bond interest rate.
8Table 1.Granger Causality Tests
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Probability Period
IB3M does not Granger Cause IC




0.040 II/1994 - VI/2001
IB6M does not Granger Cause IC




0.029 II/1994 - VIII/1998
IB12M does not Granger Cause IC




0.532 II/1994 - VI/2001
IB12M does not Granger Cause IC




0.055 I/1995 - XII/1998
As in Kokoszczy´ nski (1999), we used one lag nominal variables in ﬁrst differences.
period under study. Aﬁxed rate regime with sterilized intervention aims to reﬂect, at least partially, the
periodrangingfrom1994toJune1999andcharacterizedbycapitalinﬂowsandsterilizationoperations
under the crawling-peg and, since May 1995, the crawling-band exchange rate regimes. The second
regime under study is a pure ﬂoat, that Poland ofﬁcially adopted since April 2000 but existed in
practice as from June 1999, date at which the central bank stopped its indirect interventions on the
foreign exchange market.
Third, we assume that the prices of goods are perfectly ﬂexible but there is an imperfect indexation
of nominal wages to the price level. As a consequence, a monetary policy shock will act on both
output and prices. It should be noted, however, that if the central bank is setting the nominal interest
rate, and prices of goods and nominal wages are simultaneously perfectly ﬂexible, the price level and
the nominal exchange rate under the ﬂexible rate regime are indeterminate
7.
Fourth, as is standard in the literature, we introduce in the aggregate-demand-and-supply
framework (hereafterAD/AS) abanklending channel working over and above the interestratechannel
by assuming that bonds and loans are imperfect substitutes. Therefore, there is a clear distinction
between both assets. Hence, following a monetary tightening, banks cannot offset a decline in deposits
by simply adjusting their bond holdings and keeping their loan supply unaffected. Similarly, ﬁrms
cannot offset a decrease in loan supply by simply increasing their bond issue without incurring higher
costs.
Finally, as the methodology employed in the model is comparative statics, the expected exchange
rate and inﬂation rate are assumed ﬁxed and omitted. Foreign country variables are marked with an
asterisk.
The characteristics of different markets are as follows.
The loan supply is deduced from the following simpliﬁed banks’ balance sheet (which ignores net
7 The result of price level indeterminacy of the nominal interest rate instrument in a closed-economy







with assets: nominal reserves, Rb; nominal bonds, Bb;n o m i n a ll o a n s ,Ls; and liabilities: nominal
deposits, Ds. Since reserves consist only of required reserves, i.e. Rb = τDs,w h e r eτ denotes the
reserve requirement coefﬁcient, the banks’ adding-up constraint is:
B
b + L
s =( 1− τ)D
s.
Assuming that the desired structure of banks’ portfolio is a function of rates of return on loans and
bonds, the loan supply is:
L
s = Γ(Il,I b)D
s(1 − τ) with: ΓIl > 0,ΓIb < 0, (1)
where Γ is the proportion of deposits out of required reserves that banks wish to hold under credit
form. The loan supply is an increasing function of the loan interest rate. This means that the price of
l o a n si sp e r f e c t l yﬂexible and clears the loan market. Due to the substitution effect, it is a decreasing
function of the bond interest rate. In order to simplify our expressions we write hereafter each variable
as a deviation around the steady state: we write, for instance for an X variable, x as a deviation in
percentage (or in logarithm):







Therefore, for a given reserve requirement coefﬁcient, the linear form of the loan supply function (1)
is:
l
s = γlil − γbib + d
s, (2)
with γl and γb standing for the loan interest rate and the bond interest rate elasticities of loan supply
respectively. In the credit market, borrowers choose between loans and bonds according to the interest
rates on the two instruments. The nominal loan demand is:
l
d = p − λlil + λbib + λyy, (3)
with λl, λb and λy denoting the loan interest rate, the bond interest rate and the income elasticities
of loan demand respectively, y the real output and p the price of output. The positive dependence on
income captures thetransactions demandfor creditwhich might arise fromworking capital or liquidity
considerations.
We ignore cash and we do not model the deposit supply while assuming that it is determined
by shocks to deposit demand. Hence, the nominal supply of deposits is equal, for a given reserve
requirement ratio, to bank reserves rb:
d
s = rb. (4)
The nominal demand for deposits dd depends positively on the real income and negatively on the bond
interest rate:
d
d = p + βyy − βbib, (5)
10where βb and βy are the bond interest rate and the income elasticities of deposit demand respectively.
As in Dibooglu and Kutan (2001) we assume an imperfect capital mobility, hence the equation of
t h eo v e r a l lb a l a n c eo fp a y m e n t si sw r i t t e na s :
b ≡− zy + ρ(e + p
∗ − p)+k(ic − i
∗
c), (6)
with ethe nominal exchange rate expressed as the domestic currencyprice per unit of foreigncurrency,
z the imports elasticity of output demand, p∗ the price of foreign output and i∗
c the foreign interest rate.
The current account is determined by the level of output at home in relation to output abroad (assumed
ﬁxed and hence omitted) and the real exchange rate. The positive coefﬁcient on the real exchange
rate assumes that the Marshall-Lerner-Robinson condition holds. The capital account is determined
by the home interest rate in relation to the interest rate abroad. The parameter k represents the degree
of capital mobility and large values of k indicate higher levels of capital mobility. In case of a purely
ﬂexible exchange rate regime the balance of payments converges towards zero in equilibrium (b =0 )
because by deﬁnition there is no foreign exchange intervention. However, in a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime with sterilized intervention, b = rc where rc is the amount of international reserves needed
to clear the foreign exchange market. To illustrate what is meant by sterilization policy, consider the
following simpliﬁed balance sheet of the central bank:
rc + bg = rb + bc,
with bg government bonds and bc central bank securities, meaning there is net indebtedness of the
central bank towards commercial banks. As will be shown hereafter, a monetary tightening leads to an
increase in international reserves and to a decrease in output, in prices and hence, given (4) and (5), to
an endogenous decrease in banking reserves. We consider that the central bank completely neutralizes
the effects that its intervention in the foreign exchange market has on the monetary base. Therefore,
sterilization operations imply an increase in bc such that dbc = drc − drb or, alternatively, monetary
authorities can proceed to an outright sale of government bonds (i.e. to a decrease in bg such that
dbg = drb − drc). In practice, the second possibility was seldom used by Polish monetary authorities.
With foreign income and consumption exogenous, the real net demand for domestic goods is given
by:
y = −θlil − θbib − zy + ρ(e + p
∗ − p), (7)
with θl, θb and z the loan interest rate, the bond interest rate and the imports elasticities of output
demand respectively.
In accordance with Walras’s law, we do not need to consider the bond market.
The aggregate supply function is derived from the following four equations:
y = a + αn with: α ∈]0;1[, (8)
11p = w − a +( 1− α)n, (9)
w = σpc with: σ ∈ [0;1[, (10)
pc = χp +( 1− χ)(e + p
∗), (11)
with n labor, w wages, a total labor productivity, pc the consumer price index and σ measuring the
degree of nominal rigidities in the labor market. Equation (8) is a production function, (9) is a price
setting equation issued from the proﬁt maximization condition in a perfect competition framework,
(10) is a wage setting equation and (11) deﬁnes the consumer price index as a weighted average of the
price of home goods and the price of imported goods. We assume an inﬂuence of price variations on
real wages due to an imperfect adjustment of nominal wages: σ < 1. The bigger the nominal rigidities
are, the smaller σ is. Using (8), (9), (10) and (11) the aggregate supply curve can be written as:
y = κ0 + κ1p − κ2e with: κ0 =









Finally, given our assumption that the bond interest rate is equal to the intervention rate, i.e. ib = ic,
the general equilibrium of the model is solved for (y,p,il,r b) and e (under a ﬂexible rate regime) or rc
(under a ﬁxed rate regime with sterilized intervention) using the following system of ﬁve equations:

    
    
(IS) y = −θlil − θbic − zy + ρ(e + p∗ − p),
(LM) p + βyy − βbic = rb,
(BP) b ≡− zy + ρ(e + p∗ − p)+k(ic − i∗
c),
(CR) p − λlil + λbic + λyy = γlil − γbic + rb,
(AS) y = κ0 + κ1p − κ2e.
(13)
2.2 Comparative Statics of an Interest Rate Monetary Shock in the Two Regimes
Let us ﬁrst consider the ﬁxed exchange rate regime with sterilized intervention. Using (13) with
b = rc, the comparative statics of a monetary policy shock assimilated to a change in the intervention























































where: ∆1 = κ1θl(λy − βy)+( λl + γl)[ρ + κ1(z +1 ) ]<> 0.
12Let us now consider a pure ﬂoating exchange rate regime. Using (13) with b =0the comparative





























































where: ∆2 = θl(λb + γb + βb)+( λl + γl)(θb + k) > 0 and ∆3 = θl(λy − βy)+λl + γl <> 0.
There is one theoretical ambiguity concerning these results, linked to the value of the income
elasticity of deposit demand, βy, as compared to the income elasticity of loan demand, λy.I fλy > βy
then ∆1 > 0, ∆3 > 0 and there are no ambiguities relating to the sign of all different multipliers in
both regimes, except for the interest rate multipliers (16) and (21). If, instead, λy < βy then ∆1 <> 0,
∆3 <> 0 and the sign of all multipliers in both regimes is undetermined.













In this case, a rise in the intervention rate will lead to a decrease in output, in prices and in banking
reserves in both regimes but also to an increase in international reserves in the ﬁx e dr a t er e g i m ea n d
to an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate in the ﬂoating rate regime.
Empirically, provided that the model and the corresponding regimes are a good description of the
economy, allthese ambiguities will not occurifa positive correlationisfoundbetweenthe intervention
rate and the loan rate. In the next section, we present the empirical results indicating that the loan rate
was an increasing function of the intervention rate in the period under consideration.
2.3 The Variations in the Interest Rate Spread as an Indicator of Ampliﬁcation
and Attenuation Effects
In order to measure the impact of the bank lending channel we need to deﬁne a standard AD/AS
model as a benchmark model. This is readily done by assuming perfect substitution between bank




(IS) y = −(θl + θb)ic − zy + ρ(e + p∗ − p),
(LM) p + βyy − βbic = rb,
(BP) b ≡− zy + ρ(e + p∗ − p)+k(ic − i∗
c),
(AS) y = κ0 + κ1p − κ2e.
(24)


























(ρ + zκ1)(θl + θb + k)+kκ1



















− βb < 0. (28)
While under a pure ﬂoat the comparative statics results of a monetary shock issued from (24) (with










































− βb < 0. (32)
We derive the conditions under which the bank lending channel ampliﬁes or attenuates the impact
of monetary policy shocks:
1) on output, prices and international reserves in the ﬁxed rate regime with sterilized intervention,
using the expressions (14), (25), (15), (26), (17) and (27);
2) on output, prices and the nominal exchange rate in the ﬂoating rate regime, using the expressions
(19), (29), (20), (30), (22) and (31).
In the ampliﬁcation case, the impact of monetary policy on the aforementioned variables in both
regimes is higher in the augmented model compared to that in the standard AD/AS model. Solving
these inequalities indicates that this situation corresponds to an increase (decrease) in the interest
rate spread between the bank lending rate and the intervention rate in the case of a restrictive
14(expansionary) monetary policy.
AMPLIFICATION
A ﬁx e dr a t er e g i m ew i t hs t e r i l i z e di n t e r v e n t i o n A ﬂexible rate regime

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In the attenuation case, the impact of monetary policy on the aforementioned variables is smaller in the
augmented model compared to that in the standard AD/AS model. Solving these inequalities indicates
that this situation corresponds to a decrease (increase) in the interest rate spread between the bank
l e n d i n gr a t ea n dt h ei n t e r v e n t i o nr a t ei nt h ec a s eo far e s t r i c t i v e( e x p a n s i o n a r y )m o n e t a r yp o l i c y .
ATTENUATION
A ﬁx e dr a t er e g i m ew i t hs t e r i l i z e di n t e r v e n t i o n A ﬂexible rate regime

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Finally, if the variations in different variables are exactly the same in both frameworks, then after a
monetary shock we should observe an unchanged interest rate spread.
NEUTRALITY
A ﬁx e dr a t er e g i m ew i t hs t e r i l i z e di n t e r v e n t i o n A ﬂexible rate regime

   
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Several additional comments can be made.
First, it follows from these results that the variations in the interest rate spread are also a good
indicatorwhendistinguishingbetween ampliﬁcationandattenuationeffectsofmonetary policy shocks
on the real exchange rate in both regimes. For the ﬂoating rate regime, the explanation originates from
the fact that the real exchange rate is an decreasing function of the intervention rate: since κ1 > κ2,
t h e r ei sah i g h e ri m p a c to fam o n e t a r ys h o c ko nt he nominal exchange rate than on prices in the
augmented model (see (20) and (22)) as well as in the AD/AS model (see (30) and (31)).
15Second, in the ﬁxed exchange rate regime an ampliﬁed restrictive monetary policy shock leads to a
stronger increase in international reserves and decrease in banking reserves and therefore to a higher
volume of sterilization operations.
Third, a closer examination of (16) and (21) indicates that both interest rate multipliers are an
increasing function of γb and λb, and a decreasing function of λl and γl. Therefore, if ceteris paribus
γl > γb, i.e. banks are more reactive in their credit decisions to loan interest rates as compared to
monetary policy-led bond interest rates, then the response of loan rates to a change in the intervention
rate will be smaller and the probability of attenuation effects will increase. The same outcome will
arise if ceteris paribus λl > λb,i . e . ﬁrms are “bank-dependent” borrowers having a more difﬁcult
access to the bond market as compared to the loan market.
One should note that if the two main assumptions detailed in Bernanke and Blinder (1988a) apply,
t h e r ew i l lb eas y s t e m a t i ca m p l i ﬁcation of monetary policy shocks in both regimes.

















Fourth, Poland’s capital markets are fairly shallow: in March 2000, commercial bonds represented
only 1.2 per cent and commercial papers only 5.8 per cent of total bank credit to enterprises (Łyziak,
2001). Hence, banks are almost the unique source of borrowed funds for the corporate sector.
Moreover, according to the National Bank of Poland’s monthly surveys of companies, the share of
ﬁrms using bank credit grew from approximately 80 per cent in 1995 to more than 85 per cent in 1999
(Łyziak, 2001). These stylized facts render attenuation effects more likely since they suggest that the
value of λl should be strong while that of λb close to zero.
3 An Empirical Assessment of the Bank Lending Channel Asymmetry
3.1 Data Description and Pre-testing
We analyze monthly data of a sample that runs fromF e b r u a r y1 9 9 4t oJ u n e2 0 0 1i n c l u s i v e .W eu s e
3-month, 6-month and 1-year minimum loan rates granted to Polish ﬁrms. The loan rates are weighted
averages of interest rates applied by major banks, depending on the period (having gone from 20 banks
in January 1994 to 12 in June 2001, the difference due to the consolidation process) and representing,
on average for the period under consideration, 75.2 per cent of the banking system in terms of total
credit extended to ﬁrms and 84.7 per cent in terms of total deposits. Recall that the intervention rate of
the central bank is deﬁned as a weighted average of 1 to 14-days reverse repo operation rates and that
of the central bank securities issued for different maturities between February 1994 and January 1998,
and is equal since thentothe actual rate on 28-days NBPbills (alsotakingintoaccount the average rate
16of outright operations). These data are used to construct three different interest rate spreads deﬁned as
a difference between 3-month, 6-month and 1-year loan rates and the intervention rate of the central
bank.
Beforehavinga closerlookattheoperationofthebanklendingchannelin Poland, weseektoverify
two elements. First, we need to ﬁnd out whether the loan rates and the intervention rate move in the
same direction. This is the (H1) theoretical assumption of the model that must hold in order to ensure
that the change in the spread makes it possible to distinguish between attenuation and ampliﬁcation
effects. Second, it is necessary to check the transmission lag between the intervention rate and the
loan interest rates. To this end, we use advanced and lagged correlations between the intervention rate
and the loan rates. In Figure 6 are shown the correlation coefﬁcients between the intervention rate
at date t and the loan interest rates at date t + k. The left-hand side of the origin shows correlations
between the current monetary policy rate and lagged loan interest rates whereas the right-hand side
depicts correlations between the current monetary policy rate and the future loan rates.
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Source: National Bank of Poland and own calculations.
As we can see from Figure 6, there is a strong positive correlation between the intervention rate
and all loan rates. Hence, the assumption (H1) of the model is satisﬁed.
Concerningthetransmissionlag, wenoticethatthemaximumcorrelationisobtainedfork =0 :t h i s
indicatesaninstant(withinthemonth)pass-throughofofﬁcialinterestratestoloaninterestrates
8.T h i s
ﬁnding allows us to study the reaction of the spreads calculated between current loans and intervention
rates to changes in the intervention rate (see Figure 7).
8 For the 12-month loan rate the correlations for k =0 and k =1 are almost identical, equal
to 0.93266 and 0.93261 respectively.
173.2 Results
The visual inspection of Figure 7 shows that the period under study is not homogeneous. Recall that
a scissors-like evolution of the spreads, as compared to the policy rate, indicates attenuation effects
of monetary policy: the spreads decrease after a rise of the central bank’s rate and rise otherwise. On
the other hand, a co-movement between the spreads and the intervention rate indicates ampliﬁcation
effects of monetary policy: the spreads go up after an increase in the central bank’s rate and diminish
otherwise. Using this simple rule, we can distinguish three periods.





















Source: National Bank of Poland and own calculations.
A c c o r d i n gt oO s i ´ nski (1999), in 1994-1995, the reverse repo rate was the most important policy
instrument acting on banking interest rates. Our analysis shows possible ampliﬁcation effects in April
and May 1994 and from June to October 1995 because of the observed co-movement between the
spreads and the policy rate. Yet, care should be taken when dealing with the ﬁrst period. Indeed,
the important decline in all spreads resulted probably rather from the structural overliquidity of the
bankingsystemwhichpusheddowntheyieldofTreasurybills(seeFigure5)andsubsequentlytheloan
interest rates, than from an enhanced monetary policy effectiveness, although there was a reduction of
the intervention rate in April and May 1994. There was also an intermediate, 8-month lasting period
f r o mO c t o b e r1 9 9 4t oM a y1 9 9 5c h a r a c t e r i z e do na v e rage by possible attenuation effects of monetary
policy. However, the February 1994-December 1995 period must be analyzed with cautiousness since
in several cases, the medium lending rate moved signiﬁcantly in the opposite direction as compared to
the intervention rate.
18Beginning with January 1996 is a rather lengthy period, that lasted more than two years and a half,
until August 1998, clearly indicating a reduced potency of monetary policy. Since December 1996,
the central bank tried to curb the credit and demand expansion raising its intervention rate and the
rate of required reserves. Since these measures did not yield the expected results on banks’ behaviour,
the NBP undertook an unprecedented action. In September 1997, it began to accept 6- and 9-month
deposits directly from the public at above market rates. The goal of this move was to force banks to
substantially increase their deposit rates and, subsequently, their lending rates. Our analysis conﬁrms
the existence of a period of monetary policy weakness between December 1996 and April 1997.
The third and rather ambiguous period started in September 1998. First, we can depict several
ampliﬁcation episodes which occurred between September 1998 and January 1999 (except November
1998) and sporadically for example in December 1999, February 2000 and August 2000. However,
banks were clearly reducing the impact of monetary shocks for example in February 1999, March and
September 2000 and in the March-April 2001 period.
When using real ex post spreads and intervention rates, the analysis yields approximately similar
although not identical results (see Figure 8). The reason for this is that given the evolution of the
inﬂation rate, the real and nominal intervention rates did not necessarily move in the same direction.
There are two major differences. Taking the real intervention rate, there was an ampliﬁcation of the
central bank’s impulses between September 1994 and February 1995 and the second period should
have started at least six months earlier as compared to what is predicted by the nominal rate analysis.











Deﬂator: Consumer Price Index.
Source: National Bank of Poland and own calculations.
19Conclusion
In this paper we have developed an open-economy credit-augmented model of the transmission
mechanism. The extensions include an interest rate control with ﬂexible prices, an imperfect nominal
wage indexation and capital mobility under two different exchange rate systems: a ﬁxed rate regime
with sterilized intervention and a pure ﬂoating rate regime. Our results appear to yield an important
information for policymakers, eager to ﬁnd out the desired level of monetary conditions. We
established that in both exchange rate arrangements, the bank lending channel may amplify as well as
attenuate the action of the traditional interest rate channel. We found that the change in the interest rate
spread between a loan rate and a policy rate is a good indicator of the bank lending channel asymmetry
since it allows to gauge the efﬁciency of monetary policy impulses. If the pass-through of ofﬁcial
interest rates to loan rates is less (more) than one, this implies a weaker (stronger) impact on prices,
output and the real exchange rate in both regimes and on central bank’s foreign reserves in the ﬁxed
rate regime: the bank lending channel will therefore reduce (increase) the strength of the traditional
interest rate channel. An important explanatory factor of ampliﬁcation and attenuation effects is the
sensitivity of banks and ﬁrms to loan and market interest rates. Even though these results require a
positive relationship between loan rates and the policy rate, this is a highly probable outcome. Our
analysis shows that the bank lending channel was reducing the overall efﬁciency of monetary policy
from January 1996 to August 1998 and had, on average, a neutral effect since then. This could indicate
that the efﬁciency of monetary policy transmission increases as the transition process develops.
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